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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Bryce Cody Transue appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdicts finding him guilty of two counts of lewd conduct and one count of sexual 
abuse.  Transue claims the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict 
finding him guilty of sexual abuse, and claims the district court erred in admitting 
the CARES interviews into evidence.  
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 When she was 11 years old, A.T. told her friends at school that she 
thought she was pregnant.  (Tr.1, p.406, L.17 – p.408, L.10.)  A.T. knew 
pregnancy could result from “sexual intercourse,” and thought she was pregnant 
because of what her stepfather, Transue, had done to her.  (Tr., p.402, Ls.20-25, 
p.408, Ls.2-14, p.426, Ls.2-19.)  After one of A.T.’s friends reported A.T.’s 
statement to a teacher, an investigation ensued during which A.T. reported that, 
in addition to sexual intercourse, Transue also touched A.T.’s “woman part,” 
made her touch his “man part,” made her masturbate him, made her orally 
copulate him, put his mouth on her “woman part,” and put his “man part” in her 
“bottom” one time.  (Tr., p.416, L.9 – p.427, L.18.) Transue also showed A.T. 
pornography and read her pornographic stories, and asked A.T. questions like, 
“Do you want to do this?,” “Do you want to do that?,” and “Why can’t you do that?  
                                            
1 There are several transcripts included in the record on appeal.  All “Tr.” 
references in this brief are to the transcript of the trial that occurred August 18-
21, 2015.   
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This little 8-year-old girl can do this, but why can’t you?”  (Tr., p.427, L.19 – 
p.430, L.2.)  
 The investigation also revealed that Transue sexually offended against his 
six-year-old daughter, B.T.  B.T. testified that Transue would take his “private 
out” and make her “suck on it,” and he made B.T. put her hands “[o]n his private,” 
and move them like she was “shaking a can.”  (Tr., p.295, L.1 – p.296, L.5.)  
Transue would ejaculate on B.T. and in B.T.’s mouth and make her swallow it. 
(Tr., p.296, L.24 – p.297, L.15; Exhibit 7.)   
A grand jury indicted Transue on two counts of lewd conduct with a minor 
under the age of 16, and one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of 
16.  (R., pp.31-33.)  Transue pled not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial at 
which the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict.  (R., pp.143-165.)  As a 
result, the court reset the case for a second trial.  (R., pp.165, 216-217.)  Prior to 
the second trial, the court ordered mediation, but mediation was unsuccessful.  
(R., pp.225-226, 228.)  Following mediation, the case proceeded to a second 
trial, which ended in a mistrial due to information that was not disclosed during 
discovery.  (R., pp.242-260.) 
 After the second trial ended in a mistrial, the parties reached an 
agreement, and Transue pled guilty to one count of sexual abuse.  (R., pp.286-
304.)  Approximately two months later, Transue filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea, which the district court granted.  (R., pp.314-332.)  The court then 
rescheduled the case for a third trial.  (R., p.332.)  After the state’s case-in-chief, 
Transue moved for a judgment of acquittal on the sexual abuse charge, 
  3 
asserting, in part, that the state failed to present any evidence that Transue 
touched B.T.’s “chest.”2  (Tr., p.548, L.20 – p.549, L.1.)  The court denied the 
motion and, at the conclusion of the third trial, the jury found Transue guilty of all 
three counts.  (Tr., p.550, Ls.8-15, p.551, Ls.7-23, p.749, L.14 – p.752, L.7; R., 
pp.422-423.)   
The district court imposed consecutive unified 30-year sentences, with 
eight years fixed, for the lewd conduct convictions, and a unified 10-year 
sentence with three years fixed for the sexual abuse conviction, to run concurrent 
with the second lewd conduct sentence.  (R., pp.464-466.)  Transue filed an 
I.C.R. 35 motion, which the district court denied.  (R., pp.467-470, 491-494.)  
Transue filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.3  (R., pp.472-476.)        
    
                                            
2 To be clear, the sexual abuse charge alleged that Transue “caused or had 
sexual contact” in the form of “genital to breast” contact with B.T., and the jury 
was instructed accordingly.  (R., pp.32-33, 407.) 
 
3 Transue also filed a motion for a new trial.  (R., pp.495-500.)  The disposition of 
that motion is not reflected in the record (see R., p.15 (ROA)), nor is it raised as 
an issue on appeal (see Appellant’s Brief).  
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ISSUES 
 Transue states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Is there sufficient evidence to support the sexual abuse charge? 
2. Did the district court err by allowing the admission of the CARES 
 interviews? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Do the applicable legal standards and the evidence presented at 
trial require this Court to reject Transue’s argument that the evidence was 
insufficient to support his conviction for sexual abuse? 
 
 2. Has Transue failed to show error in the district court’s conclusion 
that the videos of the CARES interviews of Transue’s victims were admissible 
under I.R.E. 703 and I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
There Was Substantial Competent Evidence Admitted At Trial From Which The 
Jury Found Transue Guilty Of Sexual Abuse 
 
A. Introduction 
 Transue challenges his conviction for sexual abuse, claiming the evidence 
was insufficient to support the verdict because, he argues, the state failed to 
prove his “genitals touched B.T.’s breasts.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)  Transue’s 
argument fails.  Application of the correct legal standards to the evidence 
admitted at trial shows the state presented substantial competent evidence to 
prove every element of sexual abuse beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997).  
In conducting this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of 
the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, 
or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.  Id.  Moreover, the 
facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of 
upholding the jury’s verdict.  Id. 
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C. Transue’s Claim That The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence To 
Prove The Essential Elements Of Sexual Abuse Is Disproven By The 
Record 
 
 At trial, the district court instructed the jury that, in order to find Transue 
guilty of sexual abuse, it must find, in relevant part, that Transue “caused or had 
sexual contact, to wit, genital to breast” contact with B.T., “not amounting to lewd 
conduct.”  (Tr., p.707, L.24 – p.708, L.6.)  B.T. testified that, in addition to 
Transue taking his “private out” and making her “suck on it,” Transue also made 
her put her hands “[o]n his private,” and move them like she was “shaking a can.”  
(Tr., p.295, L.1 – p.296, L.5.)  B.T. testified that Transue would ejaculate in her 
mouth and make her swallow it, and he would ejaculate on her bare “stomach.”  
(Tr., p.296, L.24 – p.297, L.15; see also p.434, L.2 – p.435, L.21.)  A.T. testified 
that she witnessed this abuse of B.T. and that B.T. would be on the bed with 
Transue leaning over her when it occurred.  (Tr., p.435, L.22 – p.436, L.4.)   
B.T. was also interviewed at CARES, and a copy of that interview was 
admitted as evidence at trial.  (Exhibit 7.)  As noted by the district court in 
denying Transue’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the sexual abuse charge, 
during the CARES interview, B.T. “indicated Transue had ejaculated on her 
‘stomach’ on at least two occasions, and she appeared to indicate additional 
contact with her chest or breast when she gestured toward her chest with her 
hands while saying ‘right here.’”  (R., pp.447-448; see also Exhibit 7, 
VTS_01_2(2).VOB at 10:00, VTS_01_3(2).VOB at 00:57.)  Based on B.T.’s 
testimony and the CARES interview, there was sufficient evidence from which 
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the jury could conclude that Transue had sexual contact with B.T.’s “breasts” as 
he ejaculated on her.   
 Nevertheless, Transue claims there was insufficient evidence that his 
genitals touched his six-year-old daughter’s “breasts” because B.T.’s “testimony 
clearly demonstrates that she knew the difference between her ‘chest’ and 
‘stomach’ and she very specifically testified that she was touched on her 
stomach, not her chest.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)  Transue cites the following 
testimony in support of his argument (Appellant’s Brief, p.7): 
Q.  Okay.  And did daddy’s milk always come out of his private? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  Did any part of Daddy Bryce’s body touch your body? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  What part of his body? 
A.  His private? 
Q.  And where did his private touch? 
A.  My stomach or my mouth. 
(Tr., p.299, Ls.11-20.) 
Q.  And where did the milk go? 
A.  On my stomach and in my mouth. 
Q. . . . when his milk went into your mouth, what did you do with it? 
A.  He had to make – he made me swallow it. 
Q.  Did you always swallow it? 
A.  Yes. 
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Q.  When his milk went onto your chest, what did you do with it? 
A.  My stomach. 
Q.  Oh, I’m sorry, your stomach.  What did you do with it? 
A.  He wiped it off with a towel. 
(Tr., p.297, Ls.5-18.)  
While B.T. undoubtedly testified that Transue’s “milk” went on her 
stomach, such testimony does not change what she indicated on the CARES 
video – that it was on her stomach and “right here,” pointing to the area between 
what would be breasts in a developed female.  (Exhibit 7, VTS_01_2(2).VOB at 
10:00; VTS_01_3(2).VOB at 00:57.)  That B.T. made a distinction between her 
“stomach” and her “chest” when she testified at trial does not mean there was no 
evidence that Transue ejaculated on her “breasts,” as indicated in the CARES 
video.  Indeed, “chest,” for anatomical purposes, is defined as “the part of the 
human body enclosed by the ribs and sternum,” which would include the 
stomach area.  (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/chest.)4  As the 
district court explained: 
. . . [A] reasonable jury here may have inferred B.T.’s 
repeated references to her “stomach” included references to 
surrounding areas, and may have served as a more general term 
incorporating other more specific terms, particularly given the 
largely undifferentiated nature of the stomach, chest and breast 
areas on a young child.  A reasonable jury may have also plausibly 
inferred contact with the breast occurred in conjunction with the 
contact with the stomach, given the imprecise and sometimes 
rough nature of the activity.  Additional inferences regarding contact 
may plausibly have been drawn given B.T.’s descriptions of the 
conduct, as she explained Transue moved her head back and forth 
                                            
4 The jury instructions did not define “chest,” “breast,” or “stomach.”  (See 
generally R., pp.387-421.) 
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forcefully—perhaps her upper body necessarily followed.  A 
reasonable jury may also have inferred that although B.T. 
demonstrated some ability on the stand to distinguish a “breast” 
[sic] from a “stomach,” she may not have been infallible in making 
that distinction, and may not have always made it in the same way 
with respect to her own body.   
 
Given these various plausible inferences, and given the 
explicit testimony of B.T. and A.T., the Court concludes a rational 
jury may plausibly have found beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Transue engaged in the required “genital to breast contact” with 
B.T.  Although unnecessary for purposes of resolution of the 
sufficiency question here, the Court notes the CARES video 
footage of B.T. provided additional persuasive evidence on which a 
reasonable jury may have relied, and would alone likely constitute 
substantial evidence of the required contact, given B.T.’s gestures 
toward her chest and breast in response to the investigator’s 
questioning.   
 
(R., p.451.) 
The district court correctly concluded the evidence was sufficient to meet 
the state’s burden of proving sexual abuse.  Transue has failed to show 
otherwise.  
 
II. 
Transue Has Failed To Establish The District Court Committed Evidentiary Error 
In Admitting Videos Of The CARES Interviews 
 
A. Introduction 
 Transue asserts the district court abused its discretion in admitting the 
videos of the CARES interviews of A.T. and B.T.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-19.)  
Transue is incorrect.  The district court correctly concluded that the videos were 
admissible under I.R.E. 703, as a basis for the opinions offered by two experts 
who testified that A.T. and B.T. were sexually abused, and under I.R.E. 
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801(d)(1)(B) as prior consistent statements.  Even if the district court erred in 
admitting the videos, any error was harmless.    
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“The trial court’s judgment concerning admission of evidence shall only be 
disturbed on appeal when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.”  State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 218, 245 P.3d 961, 970 (2008) (quotations and citations 
omitted).  On appeal, the Court “reviews questions of admissibility of evidence 
using a mixed standard of review.”  State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 
P.3d 217, 221 (2008).  Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law 
reviewed de novo, but whether the evidence is subject to exclusion under I.R.E. 
403 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Id.  Idaho’s appellate courts have 
“adopted a three part test for determining whether the district court abused its 
discretion,” which test requires the Court to consider whether the trial court (1) 
“correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion,” (2) “acted within the 
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it,” and (3) “reached its decision by 
an exercise of reason.”  Id. (citation omitted).        
 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Admitting The Videos Of 
The CARES Interviews 
 
 After A.T. told friends at school that she thought she was pregnant 
because Transue had sex with her, A.T.’s friend told a teacher, and the allegation 
was reported to law enforcement.  (Tr., p.315, L.14 – p.316, L.24, p.406, L.17 – 
p.410, L.23.)  A.T. was subsequently taken to CARES for an interview on 
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February 19, 2014.  (Tr., p.319, L.24 – p.320, L.8; Exhibit 8.)  At CARES, A.T. 
again disclosed what Transue had done to her.  (Exhibit 8.)  The state filed its 
criminal complaint on April 8, 2014, and the grand jury returned a superseding 
indictment on April 23, 2014.  (R., pp.18-20, 31-33.)     
A.T. testified at trial that Transue made her take her clothes off, touched 
her “woman part,” made her touch his “man part,” made her masturbate him, 
made her orally copulate him, put his mouth on her “woman part,” and put his 
“man part” in her “woman part and one time [in her] bottom.”  (Tr., p.416, L.9 – 
p.427, L.18.)  A.T. also testified that Transue showed her pornography and read 
her pornographic stories, and asked her questions like, “Do you want to do this?,” 
“Do you want to do that?,” and “Why can’t you do that?  This little 8-year-old girl 
can do this, but why can’t you?”  (Tr., p.427, L.19 – p.430, L.2.)   
 B.T. was also interviewed at CARES on February 19, 2014 and, like A.T., 
B.T. described what Transue had done to her.  (Exhibit 7.)  Also like A.T., B.T. 
testified at trial and detailed the sexual acts Transue subjected her to, including 
making her “suck” on his “private,” and making her shake his “private” like “a 
can.”  (Tr., p.295, L.1 – p.299, L.25.)   
 During cross-examination of A.T. and B.T., Transue implied that the state 
influenced the girls’ testimony.  For example, the following exchange occurred 
during the cross-examination of B.T.: 
Q.  And you indicated that you had met with [the prosecutor] before 
last week I believe? 
 
A.   Yes. 
 
Q.  How many times have you met with [her]? 
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A.  A lot. 
 
Q.  A lot? 
 
A.  Yeah. 
 
Q.  How many times – have you met with anyone else with the 
prosecutor’s office? 
 
A.  Jackie. 
 
Q.  Jackie.  How often do you get to talk to Jackie? 
 
A.  A lot. 
 
. . .  
 
Q.  Now, I see you have a pink bunny that you got there? 
 
A.  Yeah. 
 
Q.  What’s his name or her name? 
 
A.  I don’t know yet. 
 
Q.  You don’t know yet.  Where did you get your pink bunny? 
 
A.  Jackie and [the prosecutor]. 
 
Q.  They gave you that pink bunny? 
 
A.  Yeah. 
 
Q.  Well, that was nice of them.  And when did they give that to 
you? 
 
A.  A long time ago. 
 
(Tr., p.305, L.21 – p.307, L.11.)  
 Similarly, the following exchange occurred during A.T.’s cross-
examination: 
Q.  When was the last time you met with [the prosecutor]? 
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A.  I think it was like last week. 
 
Q.  That was to prepare to talk today? 
 
A.  Yes. 
 
Q.  How often do you get to talk to her? 
 
A.  Sometimes I get to talk to her when it’s about this or something 
else. 
 
Q.  Was there anyone else from the prosecutor’s office that you get 
to talk to? 
 
A.  Jackie.  
 
Q.  How often do you get to talk to Jackie? 
 
A.  Not as often. 
 
(Tr., p.440, L.15 – p.441, L.2.)  Transue later asked A.T. about some 
inconsistencies between her testimony at the prior trials and her testimony at the 
current trial.  (Tr., p.446, L.17 – p.448, L.1.)  Then, during recross-examination, 
Transue inquired further into A.T.’s relationship with individuals from the 
prosecutor’s office: 
Q.  So you’ve met with [the prosecutor] and Jackie quite a bit? 
 
A.  Yes. 
 
Q.  Do you like them? 
 
A.  Yes. 
 
Q.  Are they nice to you? 
 
A.  Yes. 
 
Q.  Do they give you things? 
 
A.  When I’m good. 
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Q.  What kind of things?  Candy, toys? 
 
A.  They would give me candy if I was like special, it was a special 
occasion or something.  I have a big bag of popcorn in there in the 
next room.   
 
Q.  And so over the last year and a half, you’ve probably talked to 
them about this case more than anyone else? 
 
A.  Yes. 
 
Q.  Are you worried you might disappoint them? 
 
A.  Sometimes if I don’t – I like to finish what I do.  I don’t – I’m not 
a slacker. 
 
(Tr., p.455, L.14 – p.456, L.10.)     
 After both B.T. and A.T. testified, the state moved to admit the videos of 
the CARES interviews to rebut the implication that A.T. was modifying her 
testimony “in order to please” the prosecutor or Jackie.  (Tr., p.457, Ls.5-17.)  
The court granted the state’s motion concluding the interview was admissible 
pursuant to I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B); the court applied the same rationale to the 
interview of B.T.  (Tr., p.458, L.16 – p.460, L.20, p.462, L.23 – p.463, L.16, p.490, 
L.2 – p.492, L.17.)  The district court also determined both interviews were 
admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 703.  (Tr., p.485, L.23 – p.490, L.1.)  Both 
conclusions were correct.  
Rule 703, I.R.E., states, in pertinent part:  “Facts or data that are 
otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the 
opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in 
assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their 
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prejudicial effect.”5  The district court found that the videos of the CARES 
interviews satisfied this standard, “specifically find[ing] that the probative value of 
allowing these CARES interviews into [evidence] and the experts to be able to 
point to the CARES interview[s] as the reasons for forming the opinions that they 
have expressed substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect of their admission.”  
(Tr., p.488, Ls.12-19.)  The court further explained: 
We have all – many elements, delays of disclosure, 
incomplete disclosures by the older child [A.T.], expression of 
sexual knowledge not normally held by children of their ages being 
able to specifically describe them, demonstrating movements by 
hand and body movements of hand and body by both herself and 
the alleged perpetrator by [B.T.].  I don’t think that those kinds of 
demonstrations either would normally be known by young children 
nor that they could adequately be expressed by mere testimony of 
now a 6- or 7-year-old [B.T.] in court. 
 
Thus, I believe and conclude in this case that the CARES 
interviews were relied on by the experts.  They’re part of a national 
protocol which are generally relied on by experts in the field.  
Although hearsay, the experts can rely on them, and I make the 
further step that disclosure of them to the jury is helpful in 
understanding the rationale for the development of the expert 
opinions.  Those expert opinions wouldn’t read – mean much to the 
                                            
5 In State v. Scovell, 136 Idaho 587, 592, 38 P.3d 625, 630 (Ct. App. 2001), the 
Court considered whether hearsay is admissible under I.R.E. 703 pursuant to the 
language of the rule that reads, “If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in 
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or 
date need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to 
be admitted.”  The Court concluded that portion of the rule “addresses the type of 
information upon which an expert may rely in developing the opinions or 
inferences to which the expert will testify at trial; the rule does not contain any 
provision for admission into evidence of the material the expert relied upon.”  
Scovell, 136 Idaho at 592, 38 P.3d at 630 (emphasis original).  The Court did not, 
however, address whether hearsay could be admitted pursuant to the last 
sentence of I.R.E. 703, which the district court relied on in this case.  Id. at 592-
593, 38 P.3d at 630-631.  Notably, the challenged evidence in Scovell was not a 
video of a CARES interview, but in determining admission of the challenged 
evidence was harmless, the Court relied, in part, on a video of a CARES 
interview that was admitted.  Id. at 593, 38 P.3d at 631.       
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jury if they just said you reviewed the interview – if they could only 
be asked, “You reviewed the interview.  As a result of that review 
what is your conclusion?” that sex – that the children had been 
sexually abused, that’s not worth much and could be set aside, 
and, in fact, the jury can only understand truly why those experts 
reached that decision by also reviewing the videotapes.  And 
they’re necessary for the jurors to understand the value of that 
evidence for the formation of the expert opinion.     
 
(Tr., p.488, L.20 – p.490, L.1.) 
 A review of the district court’s analysis of I.R.E. 703 as it applied to the 
CARES interviews shows the court properly perceived its decision was 
discretionary, acted within the bounds of its discretion, and reached its decision 
by an exercise of reason.  As such, application of the law to the facts shows no 
error.      
 Transue “acknowledges that the CARES interviewers relied upon their 
interviews of A.T. and B.T. in forming their opinions, but he asserts that the 
probative value of the interviews themselves in assisting the jury to evaluate their 
opinions does not substantially outweigh their prejudicial effect.”  (Appellant’s 
Brief, pp.10-11.)  Transue further complains that “[a] holding that a jury could only 
understand a CARES nurse’s testimony by reviewing the video would transform 
the CARES nurse into a conduit for the introduction of hearsay evidence.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.12.)  Transue’s arguments fail. 
 First, Transue’s argument that the interviews were unfairly prejudicial does 
not demonstrate error in the district court’s analysis.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-11, 
13.)  “The determination of whether to admit evidence challenged on the ground 
that it is more prejudicial than probative is clearly within the trial court’s 
discretion,” and that determination “will not be disturbed on appeal absent an 
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abuse of discretion.”  State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 853, 828 P.2d 879, 882 
(1992) (citing cases).  Although Transue labels the videos “prejudicial,” he does 
not identify any basis for finding them unfairly prejudicial.  (Appellant’s Brief, 
p.13.)  Indeed, his only claim of prejudice is that the video interviews show A.T. 
and B.T. describing “graphic instances of alleged sexual abuse.”  (Appellant’s 
Brief, p.13.)  However, A.T. and B.T. also described “graphic instances” of sexual 
abuse and lewd conduct as part of their testimony.  Transue cannot claim unfair 
prejudice as a result of the very conduct that formed the basis of the charges 
against him.  “Most evidence is inherently prejudicial,” the question is whether it 
is “unfairly prejudicial such that it tends to suggest a decision on an improper 
basis.”  State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 309, 336 P.3d 232, 242 (2014) (citations 
and quotations omitted, emphasis original).  Because Transue has offered no 
argument to support a finding of unfair prejudice, he has failed to demonstrate 
the district court abused its discretion in its “specific[ ] find[ing] that the probative 
value of allowing these CARES interviews . . . substantially outweighs any 
prejudicial effect.”  (Tr., p.488, Ls.12-19.)     
 Second, Transue’s complaint that the district court’s ruling allowed the 
CARES nurses to be a “conduit for the introduction of hearsay” ignores the fact 
that the nurses were allowed to be a “conduit” for hearsay without the videos as 
evidenced by Ann Guzman’s testimony in which she relayed what A.T. reported 
during her interview.  (Tr., p.153, Ls.20-21, p.204, L.19 – p.222, L.24.)  Indeed, 
Transue agrees that experts, like the CARES nurses, can “testify as to why the 
interview brought about their conclusion” that a child was sexually abused and 
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“discuss why the child’s responses affected their opinions.”  (Appellant’s Brief, 
p.12 (emphasis original).)  If the victims’ statements during the CARES interviews 
are admissible if repeated by a CARES nurse, which Transue concedes, absent 
a finding of unfair prejudice, they are also admissible in their original form.  For 
the reasons stated, Transue’s claim of unfair prejudice fails; therefore, his claim 
of error under I.R.E. 703 fails.          
In addition to being admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 703, the district court 
correctly concluded the victims’ statements during the CARES interviews were 
also admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).  Under I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), a 
statement is not hearsay if “[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is 
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is” 
“consistent with declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or 
implied charge against declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or 
motive; or, to rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness when attacked 
on another ground.”  The policy underlying the rule allowing the admissibility of 
prior consistent statements to rebut a claim of recent fabrication is to show that 
the declarant made statements similar to those claimed to be false in a context 
where there was no undue influence.  State v. McAway, 127 Idaho 54, 58-59, 
896 P.2d 962, 966-67 (1995).  Importantly, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
previously applied I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) to the admission of a video of a CARES 
interview, finding the “videotape had substantial probative value on the issue of 
whether there had been recent fabrication or improper influence.”  Id.     
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Applying I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) to the victims’ statements during their CARES 
interviews, which interviews occurred prior to the state filing charges against 
Transue, the district court reasoned: 
 In this case, the defense has brought out, first of all with 
[B.T.], that she met with the prosecuting attorney and Jackie from 
the prosecuting attorney’s office a number of times and that she 
was carrying a pink rabbit that was given to her by Jackie in the 
prosecuting attorney’s office in here.   
 
 With respect to [A.T.], she was also questioned about the 
number of meetings she had had with the prosecuting attorney, 
also questioned with the facts that at various times in those 
meetings she was given candy and popcorn.   
 
 The question then arises whether that’s sufficient to raise an 
implied charge of fabrication or improper influence or motive.  In 
reviewing State versus McAway, admittedly that case was 
somewhat different and potentially distinguishable, but in that case 
the Idaho Supreme Court ruled, in fact, that the CARES interview 
was admissible under 801(d)(1)(B) because there was an implied 
claim that the mother had tried over a period of time to influence the 
young child’s testimony to be given at trial.  The CARES interview 
was admissible because it was before mother’s influence, 
admissible to demonstrate that that was not the case in that case. 
 
 [Defense counsel] argued on behalf of the defense that there 
was no intent to raise that -- any indication of recent fabrication or 
improper influence or motive.  However, there’s federal case law, 
United States versus Hamilton 689 F.2d 1262, a Sixth Circuit case 
in 1982 in which the federal court noted that under rules very 
similar to Idaho’s rules of criminal -- or Rules of Evidence that 
defense counsel’s attack on a witness need not have the intent to 
imply a recent fabrication as long as a jury might infer a charge or 
form -- as to the form or manner of the question.  That was also the 
same conclusion in United States versus Baron, 602 F.2d 1248, a 
Seventh Circuit 1979 case, where they said the fact that defense 
counsel may not have intended to imply that a witness’s story was 
fabricated is irrelevant if that inference fairly arises from the line of 
questioning pursued. 
 
(Tr., p.490, L.11 – p.492, L.6.)  
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 Transue asserts the district court’s I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) ruling was 
erroneous because, he contends, there “was clearly no express charge of recent 
fabrication or improper influence,” and “no implied charge” because “[o]f course 
the prosecutor’s office is going to meet with the alleged victim in a felony case,” 
and especially in a case involving children.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.16.)  According 
to Transue, the questioning of the victims on cross-examination merely reflected 
his attempts to demonstrate that “the prosecutor [was] doing his or her job.”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.17.)  Transue’s attempt to characterize his cross-
examination as an effort to show the prosecutor was doing “her job” is not well-
taken.  That was not the express, nor implicit purpose of his questions.  Rather, 
the implication was, as the district court noted, that A.T.’s and B.T.’s testimony 
was influenced by the nature and number of their contacts with prosecutorial 
staff.  Indeed, that such an implication was the motive behind Transue’s cross-
examination on this point is supported by Transue’s later effort to introduce 
testimony that “these children” were “encouraged by gifts to testify.”  (Tr., p.617, 
L.10 – p.618, L.16.)   
 Transue also “notes that he was not the only party to ask B.T. about 
meeting the prosecutor,” because, the following exchange occurred between B.T. 
and the prosecutor during the direct examination: 
Q.  Now, [B.T.], have we met before? 
 
A.  Yes. 
 
Q.  In fact, last week did you get to come up into this room? 
 
A.  Yes. 
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Q.  What’s the best part of coming up to this room? 
 
A.  Being Judge [B.T.]. 
 
Q.  Why do you like to be Judge [B.T.]? 
 
A.  Because I get to tell everybody what to do. 
 
Q.  And who did you tell what to do? 
 
A.  You, mommy, and Erica. 
 
Q.  I’m Erica. 
 
A.  Well, Jessica. 
 
Q.  Oh, okay.  And what did you make us do as judge? 
 
A.  Go sit places. 
 
Q.  Go sit everywhere.  Now, [B.T.], what is your job in court? 
 
A.  To tell the truth. 
 
Q.  In fact, what is the name of the chair you’re sitting in? 
 
A.  The truth chair. 
 
Q.  And when we met, did we talk about what happened and why 
you were coming to court? 
 
A.  Yes. 
 
Q.  Who asked the questions? 
 
A.  You. 
 
Q.  Who had the answers? 
 
A.  Me. 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.17-18 (quoting Tr., p.280, L.12 – p.281, L.17).)   
What Transue fails to note is that this exchange was part of the foundation 
for establishing B.T.’s competency to testify.  (Tr., p.271, L.16 – p.281, L.21.)  
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Nevertheless, the state agrees with Transue’s assertion “that this questioning 
does not amount to an express or implied charge against A.T. or B.T. of recent 
fabrication, improper influence, or motive.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.16.)  That does 
not, however, mean that Transue’s questioning did not amount to such.  The 
nature and purpose of the questioning by the adversarial parties is clearly 
different.  Transue’s argument that his cross-examination of A.T. and B.T. 
regarding the extent and nature of their interaction with prosecutorial staff did not 
imply that A.T.’s and B.T.’s testimony was influenced is without merit, and he has 
failed to show error in the district court’s I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) ruling.   
Transue has failed to establish any error in the admission of the videos of 
the CARES interviews of A.T. and B.T.   
 
D. Even If Error, The Admission Of The Videos Of The CARES Interviews 
Was Harmless 
  
Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”  I.C.R. 52.  
“Error is not reversible unless it is prejudicial.”  State v. Starr, 161 Idaho 345, ---, 
385 P.3d 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2016) (citation omitted).  “An error is harmless if, 
and only if, the appellate court is able to say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the jury would have reached the same result absent the error.”  State v. Razo-
Chavez, 159 Idaho 590, 593, 364 P.3d 291, 294 (2015) (quotations and citations 
omitted).  This Court can easily conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
jury would have reached the same verdicts without the videos of the CARES 
interviews.        
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Even if the district court erred in admitting the videos of the CARES 
interviews, the error was harmless given the cumulative nature of the evidence 
included on the videos.  Both A.T. and B.T. testified at trial and described the 
abuse perpetrated on them by Transue.  (See generally Tr., pp.289-312, 414-
437.)  Ann Guzman, a pediatric nurse at CARES who examined A.T., also 
testified about the sexual acts described by A.T., and both girls testified that they 
witnessed Transue molest the other.  (Tr., p.153, Ls.20-21, p.204, L.19 – p.222, 
L.24, p.301, L.14 – p.303, L.10, p.433, L.6 – p.436, L.4.)  Further, had the court 
not admitted the video interview of B.T., Alisa Ortega, the CARES nurse who 
examined B.T., would have testified to the contents of the video that formed the 
basis of her diagnostic opinion that B.T. was sexually abused.  (See Tr., pp.465-
480, 499-500.)  At worst, the evidence on the videos was cumulative and any 
error in their admission was harmless.  Compare State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 
867, 332 P.3d 767, 779 (2014) (concluding that even though the district court 
erred in excluding certain testimony, the error was harmless because the 
testimony was “merely cumulative”).          
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdicts finding Transue guilty of two counts of lewd conduct and 
one count of sexual abuse.  
 DATED this 15th day of March, 2017. 
 
      _/s/ Lori A. Fleming_________ 
     for JESSICA M. LORELLO 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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